



# Canada's Coastal Marine Security Operations Centre - East

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
Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada



# Today's Discussion

- Background
- Partners – Who we are, our area(s) of responsibility
- Marine Domain Awareness, and the challenge of the shipping industry.
- MSOC functions and tools
- Examples
  - Example – Covid
  - Example - Arctic
- Discussion





## Purpose/Background/Objectives

- The 2004 National Security Policy called for two Coastal MSOC's, led by DND/CAF in Halifax and Esquimalt.
- The objective of the MSOC's was to detect, assess, and respond to a marine security threat.
- A third MSOC, led by RCMP, was established in Niagara for the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway Region in 2006.
- MSOC's are a key component of Canada's efforts to strengthen maritime security, and their work provides a more complete picture of Canada's maritime environment.
- Six core Federal partners, (DND/CAF, RCMP, CBSA, CCG, DFO, and TC), are co-located to leverage resources, and expertise to generate Marine Domain Awareness (MDA) in support of "A whole-of-government" approach.



# MSOC in support of Government of Canada (GoC) Priorities

- Provide a vehicle for partners to share information on a 24/7 basis and foster collaboration amongst core partners.
- Routinely contribute, share and compare information through DND/CAF-hosted National Maritime Picture (NMP) database.
- Additional information shared on a case-by-case basis.
- Provide warning and support to coordinated responses to maritime-related threats or events conducted outside the MSOCs by departments and agencies pursuant to their respective mandates.

*“These Marine Security Operations Centres will have the authority and capacity, through interagency staffing, to bring to bear all civilian and military resources necessary to detect, assess, and respond to a marine security threat.” – NSP 2004*



**Canadian Coast Guard**



**Canada Border Services Agency**



**Royal Canadian Navy**



**Transport Canada**



## MSOC Partners

**Royal Canadian Mounted Police**



**Fisheries and Oceans Canada**





# Marine Security Interests by Departmental Regions



Departmental Regions Contributing to MDA		
	Atlantic	Arctic
TC	2 Regions	3 Regions
CCG/C&P	2/4 Regions	1/1 Regions
CBSA	2 Regions	4 Regions
RCMP	5 Divisions	5 Divisions
CF	2 JTFs	5 JTFs

- MDA crosses many jurisdictions
- No geographic congruity
- No common vertical/horizontal communication matrix



## MSOC E Area of Responsibility



**MSOC West**

**Great Lakes MSOC**


**MSOC East**



# Maritime Domain Awareness

- Canada's maritime domain is complex and involves many domestic and international actors.
- More than 300 commercial ports handle billions of dollars worth of goods annually.
- Canada's marine transportation system is core to Canada's economy and international trade, and links to the global supply chains.

*Maritime domain awareness means having true and timely information about everything on, under, related to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway. This includes all related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, or other means of transport.*








# MDA & the “Shipping Complex” (The Challenge)

- 1. Maritime Terror
- 2. Counter-Intelligence
- 3. Migration
- 4. Narcotics
- 5. Prohibited Cargoes (CBNRE/WMD)
- 6. Economic Exploitation
- 7. Marine Pollution
- 8. Piracy & Marine Crime
- 9. Vessel Movements

People  
 Business  
 Cargo  
 Ship  
 Voyage  
 External Influences





## MSOC Functions

**Surveillance:** systematic observation of places, persons, or things that could affect national maritime security.

**Intelligence and Warning:** develop products based on the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, criminal organization and activities.

**Coordination:** facilitate inter-agency planning and action.


**Collaboration:** advance beyond the limitations of everyday information sharing, and foster an integrated team environment with constant problem solving dynamics. Collaborative intelligence priorities include threats like terrorism; drug smuggling, marine-facilitated migration, pollution, illegal fishing and regulatory non-compliance.

**Note:** The production of joint information and intelligence products does not assume involvement or contribution by all MSOC partners




# The MSOC Toolbox


## Multi-Departmental OPCEN




## Communications



## Intelligence



## METOC



## Geomatics

## Information Management





# Integrated Information Environment




Interdepartmental organizations that leverage the capability, capacity and authority of the partnering departments and agencies to enhance marine security through collaborative detection, assessment and warning thereby supporting responses to threats that challenge our nation's security from our seaward approaches.





## MSOC Contribution

- Thousands of vessels daily – Big Data
- Focus on the unknowns
- Conduct assessments vessels/places/topics (TC)
- Identify, document, share info on activity, maritime interests
  - *Discussions in/outside MSOC, other MSOC type orgs ie. US*





# TC Examples

- Marine Advisories:
  - Red Sea
  - Gulf of Guinea
  - Gulf of Oman
- Piracy – International Reporting
- Threat Assessments
- COVID 19 – Maritime monitoring & reporting

The collage shows several official documents from the Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) and the Canadian Operations Security Centre (COSM). Key documents include:

- UNCLASSIFIED (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) MSOC E MARINE INTELLIGENCE SCAN**: MSOC E 2018- 029. It states that the document is classified UNCLASSIFIED and is the property of Transport Canada Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) East. It includes a scope section: "All reporting and assessments contained in this report are based on available information from government, industry, and open sources. Information out-of-date for this product was 10 May 2018." It also has a terrorism section: "ITAC THREAT LEVEL: (ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur within Canada is MEDIUM meaning the assessed threat level within Canada is MEDIUM meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur. (U/IFOUO))".
- MSOC(E)09972018 INTELLIGENCE REPORT EVALUATION DE RENSEIGNEMENTS**: Report No.: MSOC (E) 09972018, Release Date: Apr 08, 2018, Current as of: Apr 08, 2018. It includes a disclaimer: "This document is classified UNCLASSIFIED/For Official Use Only and is the property of Transport Canada Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) East. Transport Canada provides this report to your office, agency or department in strict confidence. It is for official purposes only, and must not be reclassified, disseminated in whole or in part without the written authorization of Transport Canada Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) East. Please address your requests or comments to the following phone number: (802) 427-1502."
- THREAT ASSESSMENT Port of Halifax**: Includes the text "THIS WEEK: TC MSOC" and "Transport Canada Marine Security Operations Centres".

## TC MSOC (E) – Typical Threat Overview

THREAT	LEVEL
TERRORISM (NATIONAL)	MEDIUM
TERRORISM (MSOC(E) )	LOW IN MOST PORTS/FACILITIES
CRIME	LOW to MEDIUM BY PORT/FACILITIES
IRREGULAR MIGRATION	LOW
DOMESTIC ACTIVISM	LOW
STATE SPONSORED ACTIVITIES	LOW
CYBER THREAT	LOW

AREAS OF INTEREST

- 0-29 Vessel displays LOW indications of potential security and intelligence interest
- 30-49 Vessel has displayed MEDIUM indications of potential security and intelligence interest
- 50+ Vessel is associated with MSOC E identified threat vectors or has displayed HIGH indications of potential security and intelligence interest

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# Example - TC COVID-19 RESPONSE

To detect COVID-19 via maritime sector:

- Daily TC MSOC reporting to partners and other departments on vessels arriving from outside Canada
- Ongoing TC MSOC communication with vessels submitting 96 hr. Pre-arrival Information Report (PAIR) about suspected illness and what to do.
- 4000 vessels in 2020.
- Ill crew members for Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and Prairie Northern (Arctic) Regions identified through process.
- Procedures developed for each TC region in support of PHAC requirements and with regional COVID coordinators.

8 March 2021  
 VESSELS ENTERING NS / NB / NL : TRANSIT TIME < = 14 DAYS

VESSELS ENTERING EASTERN / ATLANTIC CANADA WITH TRANSITS < 14 DAYS						
IMO	DESTINATION	VESSEL NAME	ETA TO CDN. PORT	DEPART FROM LPOC	LPOC COUNTRY	TRANSIT TIME
9318541	POINT TUPPER	NS STREAM	07-Mar	05-Mar	NEW HAVEN	3
9640944	POINT TUPPER	ALGOMA VISION	10-Mar	03-Mar	PUERTO BOLIVAR	5
9783007	POINT TUPPER	NORDPENQUIN	10-Mar	28-Feb	ARZEW	8
9275115	SAINT JOHN	PACON	12-Mar	06-Mar	PHILIPSBURG	6
9183776	HALIFAX	ALGOMA VERITY	08-Mar	06-Mar	NEWARK	2
9395082	HALIFAX	FOUMA	11-Mar	10-Mar	NEW YORK	1
9298703	SAINT JOHN	EAST COAST	08-Mar	07-Mar	PORTLAND	1
9351921	SAINT JOHN	IVER PROSPERITY	08-Mar	07-Mar	BUCKSPORT	1
9298727	SAINT JOHN	NEW ENGLAND	08-Mar	07-Mar	BOSTON	1
9389306	ARGENTIA	EF AVA	08-Mar	05-Mar	Portland	3

- Initially screened by geographic point of origin i.e. China, Hong Kong, Italy.
- Since Global Pandemic – screen by incubation period; < 14 days since last port of call (LPOC).
- Marine Security Notification - MSN 2020-007




# Arctic Activity

## Overall - 2019 vs 2020

Vessels sailing within the NORDREG Zone down in most sectors:

- 207 (2019) vs 138 (2020) ↓ 33%
- Bulkers, General Cargo, Tugs ↓ 25-35%



## Foreign Entry

- 102 PAIRs filed by 59 vessels (2019)
  - mostly bulk carriers in ballast to Milne Inlet & cruise vessels arriving Pond Inlet from Greenland.
- 78 PAIRs filed (2020)

## Northwest Passage (NWP) Transits

- 2020 - No data
- 2019 - 25 vessels made 28 transits
- 2018 - 5 transits

ARCTIC VESSEL TRAFFIC	2019 Data				
	Vessels 2020	Vessels	Voyages**	Canadian Flag	Foreign Flag
Bulkers	42	50	101	11	39
Passenger Vessels	0	14	22	0	14
Fishing	28	32	170	24	8
General Cargo	17	27	62	24	3
Government	15	16	29	13	3
Pleasure Craft ***	2	22	23	2	20
Research Vessels	1	7	9	5	2
Tankers	11	13	22	11	2
Tugs/Barges	20	26	26	25	1
Other	2	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>92</b>

\*\* voyage defined as entry into, activity within and exiting from the zone.  
 \*\*\* The pleasure craft sector is the most difficult to monitor in the Arctic.  
 ++ Pre-arrival Information Reports (PAIRs) with TC ++





# Transport Canada

- Contributor to MSOC with Inspector and analyst functions. 24 hour coverage (both coasts).
- Monitoring regulated vessels entering Canada (PAIR)
- Intelligence and information products – i.e. marine scientific research
- Threat assessments
- Wider purpose activity: Information support to events, Covid, Whales, Pollution
- NASP coord (air support).
- No loss of time to COVID.





# QUESTIONS?

Thank you to Inspector Peter Service

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*There is no TC MSOC – Partners are key*