WHO IS DEFENDING

NOVA SCOTIA'S COASTLINE?

A Paper by the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

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The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia (RUSI NS), a member of the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, comprises some 200 retired and active members of the Canadian Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, business and community leaders. We have produced the following Paper in an attempt to answer the question "Who is Defending Nova Scotia's Coastline?"

The Paper was researched and prepared by knowledgeable members of the Security Affairs Committee (SAC) of RUSI NS under the chairmanship of Mr Gordon S. Eastwood. It has been approved by RUSI's Board of Directors.

The intent of the Paper is to help focus the attention of our political and military leaders on the Canadian Forces' role of defending the people of this country with the emphasis on the coastline of Nova Scotia.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Current and future threats to the security of Canadians are real and varied, including the vulnerability of coastal regions to terrorist acts. This requires the highest level of cooperation and coordination among all organizations with a responsibility for security. It also requires the provision of appropriate resources to enable the organizations to effectively carry out assigned tasks.

To assist the Canadian Forces and other organizations to protect the people of Nova Scotia and all Canadians, the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia recommends the Government of Canada consider the following:

1. Proceed immediately with the announced increase in the strength of the Canadian Forces.
2. Army Transformation strategy includes an increase of Canada's army reserve to 18,000 but it should consider the formation of an armored reconnaissance unit in Nova Scotia or a reactivation of the Halifax Rifles.
3. The Navy should increase littoral ("Brown Water") operations, including expanding the role of the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels or employing a new class of vessel to undertake the task.
5. Rethink the role of the Canadian Coast Guard to include coastal patrols.
6. Acquire surveillance satellites augmented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to provide improved surveillance of Nova Scotia's coastline.
7. Improve the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) capability to obtain intelligence on foreign threats to Canada.
8. Ensure maximum cooperation between the Canadian Maritime Command and Canadian Coast Guard, and the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

INTRODUCTION
Canada's Armed Forces have three major areas of responsibility:

a. Defending our homeland.
b. Upholding Canadian interests overseas.
c. Protecting international stability.

Unfortunately, the Canadian Forces (CF) today is unable through lack of resources to handle the above mandate. The Canadian military is suffering shortages of personnel, equipment, and training opportunities. Furthermore, the CF has been focusing on overseas missions to the detriment of home defence. This Paper does not deny the importance of Canadian involvement in such actions as Operation Apollo (war on terrorism), international support in Haiti, or peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. However, when such missions are given priority over the protection of Canadian citizens, then changes must be made.

This Paper will focus on Nova Scotia's coastal security. However, many facets of this Paper, such as suggestions on how to improve surveillance and intelligence abilities, could be applied equally well to the rest of the East Coast or indeed the rest of the country. Security is a complex goal, including the ability to analyze and identify possible threats, the infrastructure to turn raw data into intelligence, and finally the ability to respond to those threats in an effective and timely way. All of these capacities must exist or the chain will break when it is needed most.

BACKGROUND

Canada is a challenging nation to defend. It is the second largest landmass nation in the world, with a relatively sparse population base for its size. That population is concentrated in a relatively narrow band near the U.S. border, leaving coastal regions and large areas of northern territory with few settlements. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has noted that while the 49th parallel might be the world's longest undefended border, Canada in fact has even longer borders: coastlines which stretch nearly a quarter of a million kilometers, looking out on more than ten million square kilometers of ocean territory. Canada has the longest littoral shoreline of any country in the world.

Historically, Canada's geographic location has kept it safe from most forms of attack. The power of the British Navy kept foreign vessels from Canada's shores in the 18th and 19th centuries. As a result, most warfare took place on land, as in the War of 1812. Peace with the United States, our only direct neighbour, brought an end to this kind of warfare.

The dawn of the 20th century brought about a revolution in military thinking with the invention of the airplane. Visionaries could see that some day, airplanes or airships would possess the capacity to cross great distances to strike at targets, thereby giving every nation an aerial border that it would have to defend.

In the Second World War, the Japanese invaded the Alaskan islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian chain, a
lighthouse on Vancouver Island was fired on by a Japanese submarine, German U-Boats appeared in the St.
Lawrence River and the use of Japanese airborne incendiary weapons against the west coast of Canada illustrated
that Canada was no longer protected by her oceans from enemy attack.

Similar to today, the Canadian coastline was largely undefended at the time. There were no ground forces available
to perform routine patrols.

In 1943 the Yukon Rangers were organized at Dawson City. Approximately 150 men enlisted and received World
War 1 vintage rifles and partial uniforms. They trained in map reading and making, scouting, compass use and rifle
firing. The Northern Rangers (today's Canadian Rangers) are still Canada's experts in Arctic weather survival and
our visible presence in the northern territories.

In 1944 the shortage of military surveillance personnel was addressed by creating a volunteer unit called the Pacific
Coast Military Rangers. Its members were mostly WW1 veterans who already possessed a degree of military
training. Their jobs included coast watching, aircraft observation and assisting the RCMP in controlling enemy
aliens.

During the Cold War, military planners postulated that the most likely form a future war would take would be an
Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) strike by the Soviet Union against the U.S.A., combined with a land
assault across the Iron Curtain. Canada's role in such an event would involve early detection of ICBMs crossing
Canadian airspace, interception of enemy aircraft, and some degree of land support in Europe (for example,
Canadian military stationed at Soest and later Lahr in Germany). An invasion of Canadian soil by Warsaw Pact
countries was not considered to be a likely event.

By the early 1990s the Iron Curtain had been lifted. Military planners, after forty-five years of Cold War, had to
adapt to a world where the United States had emerged as the only superpower. It was hoped that this situation
would bring greater global stability.

Unfortunately, the opposite has occurred. These years have seen a shift towards asymmetric warfare, where smaller
groups make up for their opponents' military and technological advantages through the use of guerilla tactics and
terrorism. Many of these groups are not "nations" in the traditional sense, but smaller groups which can be based on
ethnicity, religion, political belief or a combination of the above as a unifying factor. In many cases, such as Al
Qaeda, the members of these groups are scattered through various countries. This situation makes it much more
difficult to identify "the enemy," as s/he might be living within our very borders.

Insurgents and terrorists do not wear uniforms, represent nations, follow governments or feel bound to uphold
international laws such as the Geneva Convention. Rather than attempting to defeat nations in traditional military
terms, they use non-traditional means of assault. Max Manwaring, Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army
War College, notes that "non-state political actors are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of
conventional and unconventional weaponry." To defeat them, "resourcefulness, determination and a certain
disregard for convention" are required.
The new centres of gravity are not limited to military formations and national capitals. Public opinion, national
leaders and international alliances are also targets for attack in the new warfare. Al Qaeda follows a recognized strategy of attempting to drive wedges between allied nations who oppose its activities. Confronting international instability may provoke terrorist attack but will result in greater long-term security. Canada must view national defence as not simply a matter of technology and military personnel, but also as a multi-national relationship encompassing politics, economics, and the psychology of the people of nations. Conventional war strategy no longer applies.

The challenge posed by terrorist acts is that the odds seem to be in favour of the terrorists. A defending security force is tasked to stop all possible intrusions, all of the time. A terrorist need only be lucky once to strike a devastating blow. While Canada is not the central target that the United States is, we are in the position of sharing a border with the United States and of being a traditional ally of the United States.

Canada's current interest in improving our security is threefold.

a. Canada is a viable target for terrorist attacks.
   b. In order to maintain close trading relationships with the United States, Canada needs to assure its southern neighbours that we possess adequate security. Relations between the countries will of course be adversely affected if the Americans have reason to believe that Canada is a sheltering haven for terrorists who can then make their way south over an open border, and Canadian commerce will suffer if America believes that goods coming through Canada might be compromised with dangerous and/or illegal items in the shipments.
   c. It may be fairly stated that the primary duty of a nation's defence force is to protect the citizens of that nation. Canada must be able to stand on guard for its own citizens, to defend them from external threats.

Addressing security from another perspective, the RCMP recognizes four categories of organized crime in Canada: traditional organized crime (the mafia), Asian gangs, Russian gangs and biker gangs. There is a murky relationship between terrorists and organized crime networks - with terrorists often dealing with criminals or participating in criminal activities themselves. Securing our borders will help us defend against terrorism while also cutting into organized crime such as drug dealing, weapons smuggling, illegal immigration and people-smuggling, and the violence which accompanies these activities.

Canada's-and Nova Scotia's-current security measures are inadequate. A lack of resources makes it difficult to adequately patrol our vast territory. Secondly, the multitude of agencies involved in response makes command-and-control difficult. Unlike conventional warfare, terrorist acts are not simply a military concern. The RCMP, the Coast Guard, and Canadian Border Security Agency are some of the many civilian agencies with interests and roles in protecting national security, upholding Canadian law, and preserving civilian life.

For this reason, this Paper will first address the options open to Canadians to improve surveillance around Nova Scotia, and secondly, to address the difficulties involved in turning the data which surveillance provides into intelligence regarding potential threats.

SURVEILLANCE
In an ideal world, every kilometre of Nova Scotia's coastline and every square kilometre of Canada's territorial waters would be secured against incursions by criminal or terrorist organizations. However, given the sheer length of the Nova Scotia coastline, and the areas of the province with little to no human habitation, the cost and manpower to have personnel on the scene at every possible site is clearly prohibitive. The goal, therefore, is to maximize our ability to observe as much territory as possible while minimizing cost and manpower to an acceptable level.

To further aid in this goal, areas of particular concern must be subject to more stringent security measures. For example, it is easier for large shipments of contraband to be smuggled into the Port of Halifax aboard containers, than it is for such cargoes to be offloaded at remote points along the coastline. Therefore, security measures have been concentrated at major entry points such as ports, airports and shipyards.

Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, retired Chief of the Land Staff, points out that while Canada's undefended coasts are "a potentially major access point for illegal entry...a more likely entry is through one of the country's major ports." The major port in Nova Scotia, Halifax, is in fact well prepared (perhaps the most prepared of any Canadian port) to deal with security threats. Likely targets for terrorist attack (including the two bridges, military facilities, the oil refinery and cruise ships in port among others) have been identified with counter-terrorism planned for such an eventuality should an attack occur.

To fully understand the separation of responsibilities between coordinating agencies when operations take place at sea or on land, a definition of responsibilities has been developed by the military to avoid any ambiguity in the Command and Control of assigned forces:

a. In all territorial waters on the coast of Nova Scotia, below the high water mark, responsibility lies with the Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT).

b. Above the high water mark, policing in Harbour areas is the responsibility of regional police. Where no regional police are in being, this responsibility belongs to the RCMP ("H" Division).

c. Ashore, this responsibility is taken over by the Commander, Land Forces Atlantic Area (LFAA).

SURVEILLANCE OF THE WATER
Success at improving port security may be a bittersweet victory. The more successful we become at preventing unauthorized persons and goods from entering our country through ports and airports, the more likely it will be that terrorists and criminals will focus on less-populated areas for entrance and egress. It bears mentioning that items such as "dirty bombs" need not be very large. Potentially highly damaging weapons can be smuggled in along the coastline. Furthermore, many terrorists can acquire weapons and equipment once in the country. All that is required is for trained individuals to enter the country, pick up their equipment and conduct terrorist operations. These individuals can be deterred in two ways:

a. Make it difficult for known terrorists to enter the country illegally, and

b. Have access to intelligence that will allow us to recognize individuals who pose a possible security threat.

The role of coastal surveillance is to let us identify who, and what, is entering our territorial waters. It enables us to recognize anomalies and investigate them. It is important for search and rescue purposes, as well as for security reasons, that we be able to recognize unusual events or identify ships and aircraft that are not following scheduled plans or have not submitted them.

A terrorist, however, is considerably different from a traditional soldier of an invading army. A soldier traditionally wears a uniform to identify him as a warrior of his nation; a terrorist generally masquerades as a civilian up until the point of his terrorist act. Furthermore, s/he need not be a member of any nation's military at all. As a result, civil authorities such as the RCMP have a role to play in coastal defence. The initial response to most incidents and threats is provided by the front line "first responders" (police, fire, ambulance, etc.). Support by the CF must be requested and, with a few exceptions, the CF acts only as the force of last resort for any domestic security matter. The majority of incidents may not be terrorism related and therefore not require military response.

The ideal method of stopping terrorist acts is to identify suspicious persons/vessels/aircraft and apprehend them before they approach Canadian territory. In order to identify them, surveillance must be in place. It is uneconomical to have aircraft and/or ships constantly patrolling all areas of our territorial waters. Thankfully, technology offers us some opportunities to avoid the need for a constant human presence in these areas.

There is a common misperception that Canada can easily access satellites to keep constant watch on our land and ocean territory. This is not the case. Purchasing satellite time is extremely expensive. While it is possible for satellites to be used on rare occasions, it is beyond our financial means to use satellite data to investigate every possible anomaly. LGen (ret) Mike Jeffery states that "the CF has no dedicated satellite coverage of the region (Canada), and that which is available is limited in scope."

Surveillance flights, primarily by the Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), continue but at a reduced level (about one flight per week) from previous years, largely due to Air Command cutbacks. While the Auroras still possess the best wide-area coverage available, there are problems - for one, the sensor quality is far from ideal. To address this
shortcoming, the Aurora Incremental Modernization Program (AIMP) is preparing the Auroras to play a more critical role in the surveillance/enforcement duo. When completed, the Aurora could be the only vehicle that has both the range to survey vast areas of our coastal waters as well as the speed to react to suspicious activities. However, the four-phase modernization program will take until 2007 to complete. As well, the 16 Auroras are far too few to meet Canada's needs and lack of funding prevents them flying often enough to deter serious threats to Nova Scotia.

Stealth sonobuoys are a small-scale system with global deployment possibilities. These small buoys move up and down in the water and can operate for months on standby mode. They can remain dormant until a contact is made, when they surface, transmit information, and then return to the bottom to wait. They can also be programmed to rise and report information on a predetermined schedule. Sonobuoys are another means by which we can gain information about ships operating in our territorial waters.

Canada is currently investigating the use of high-frequency radars that would be able to detect ships and aircraft beyond the horizon. High Frequency Surface Wave Radar may allow us to detect ships and low flying aircraft over 200 km away. Two of these sites, at Cape Bonavista and Cape Race in Newfoundland, are currently being converted from developmental to operational status.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) offer a way to patrol and monitor wide stretches of territory that is more fuel and manpower efficient than the use of manned aircraft for this purpose. However, UAVs have some critical limitations. A UAV on its own cannot analyze the data it collects, nor can it apprehend a suspicious looking vessel. The UAV system would require sufficient analysts to monitor the information it provides. The analysts would then contact an agency, whether that be the Coast Guard, the Navy, or the RCMP, who could act on suspicious cases and investigate further. UAVs require personnel with specific skill sets to operate and maintain them -- some of which differ from those required to care for manned aircraft. They also require beyond-line-of-sight communications to operate in a country as large as Canada. Unless we invest in a dedicated satellite downlink network, the UAV's areas of effectiveness would be minimal.

To prevent large vessels from entering Canadian waters unannounced, all ships of a certain size are required by law to carry a transponder that allow Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and other security personnel to pinpoint the vessel's location. Ships are also required to submit paperwork in advance to advise port workers of their arrival. However, it is uncertain what the procedure would be to address a vessel that did not comply with this system, for example, if the necessary information was incomplete or falsely submitted. (The CCG regional operations centre in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, receives vessel pre-arranged reports and notifies appropriate agencies of high interest vessels requesting clearance, and tracks mandatory vessel reporting at the 96-hour and 24-hour periods prior to entering Canadian waters.

Another shortcoming is that only vessels of a certain size class are required to carry a transponder. As stated above, lethal materials need not occupy a large amount of space and there is no reason why a cargo of weaponry (or drugs) cannot be carried aboard a pleasure boat. Furthermore, a pleasure boat can be sufficiently large enough to carry several individuals who might be involved in a terrorist operation and insert them into the province. A balance must be struck between ensuring freedom of travel for hundreds of legitimate pleasure boaters while maintaining an acceptable level of security.

One possible response is to make greater use of individuals living and working along the less-populated coastlines
who would volunteer to report unusual happenings to the authorities; for example, strange sightings of boats that might mean a drop-off of drugs or illegal immigrants.

SURVEILLANCE OF LAND MASS

As previously noted, in World War II personnel other than the regular army were used to guard the land approaches to Canada. At present in Atlantic Canada there are several hundred Canadian Rangers deployed in Newfoundland and Labrador and commanded from Land Forces Atlantic Area HQ in Halifax. In addition, in Nova Scotia the RCMP maintains a coastal watch program and the CCG operates the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary.

The creation of a Canadian Rangers Unit in Nova Scotia could prove highly valuable to improving coastal security in this province and elsewhere on the East Coast. Their major role would be observation and reporting, leaving any actual confrontation to the Army, Coast Guard, RCMP, etc. The existence of Rangers would also be cost-effective since the Ranger positions could either be on a volunteer basis, or else involve a small remuneration for attending a certain number of training sessions per year. Rangers would be placed under military control, however, this system would involve a close partnership with the RCMP based on the fact that many suspicious vessels or persons might be involved in criminal activity that is the domain of the police services. Should the vessels/persons be suspected of posing a threat to national security, for example the discovery of a bomb, then the military could be brought in to assist.

There are no Regular Force Combat Arms Regiments in Nova Scotia and so any immediate contribution to coastal security is provided by Reserve Army units. Apart from units of the Halifax Garrison and an artillery battery in Yarmouth all other units are deployed inland and away from the Atlantic coastline (see map) and distant from the direction in which a seaborne threat would come. LFAA has additional resources in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. Obviously, these are not as immediately and continuously available as local units, nor are they as familiar with the geography of the Nova Scotia coastline.

Formation of a Reserve reconnaissance squadron (possibly by reactivating the Halifax Rifles), located centrally in Halifax, would be a more effective and cheaper solution than relocating elements of other units (for example, the Nova Scotia Highlanders and/or the West Nova Scotia Regiment) to the Atlantic coastline. The Halifax Rifles reactivation is a suggestion that has been supported in the past by the Provincial Government and the City of Halifax.

A widely-held assumption in Canada is that the Canadian Coast Guard performs a similar function as its American counterpart. In the United States, the Coast Guard is considered a branch of the armed services. The Canadian Coast Guard is different. Its primary concerns are with rescue, safety and environmental response, aids to navigation, icebreaking, waterways development, marine communications and traffic services. Coast Guard members do not carry weapons and have no law enforcement powers (although CCG will provide marine platforms and crew to assist RCMP and other agencies for routine vessel interception and boarding).

So if the Coast Guard does not have a mandate to defend our waters from incursion, who does? The Navy does not
have the responsibility for coordination of maritime activity on a routine basis. Many of the coordination activities potentially involve criminal intelligence matters that are legally beyond the CF’s purview. The difficulty here is one of legal authority. Ships trespassing into Canadian waters illegally are considered potential criminals rather than military threats. The Navy does not have legal authority to act as floating police. In fact, should terrorists attempt to enter the country illegally, or to bring illegal weapons with them, they will first be apprehended by civilian police rather than military forces. Therefore, coastal defence and national security rely on a close working relationship between police (RCMP and/or municipal police) and the Canadian Armed Forces. LGen. Jeffery writes that "the role of the CF along our coastlines and in our ports is largely one of support to the other government agencies." However, jurisdiction is not the only challenge.

Even if the Navy were to attempt to fill in the gap, there is a shortfall in the equipment available for the purpose. Far out at sea there is no problem. Jeffery writes that "the Navy's ability to catch, stop and board a suspect vessel is good. In fact, with its experience in the Persian Gulf, Canada has since become a leader in its field." The problem lies closer to shore where frigates are limited and the only option open is the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs). However, the MCDVs are relatively slow and the crews are not trained for interdiction operations.

The Canadian Navy remains focused on Blue Water operations, conducting operations far out at sea such as in the Persian Gulf. To improve our national security, the Navy will have to shift some of its focus to being a littoral ("Brown Water") navy, in order to operate close to Canadian shores and provide maritime domestic security. It is suggested that if Canada wants to retain its proud tradition of being a Blue Water navy, and is unable to afford both a Blue Water and a Brown Water force, the Government of Canada should re-think the role of the Canadian Coast Guard.

Another possibility is that Canada encourage closer coordination with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Navy (USN) to ensure the coastal security of both nations.

INTELLIGENCE

A key capability must be intelligence, which falls to police forces and other agencies to ensure the appropriate level of warning and to target the hostile elements. The CF then needs to be able to respond on demand.

Surveillance is the means by which the agencies (civil and military) tasked to ensure Nova Scotia's security can gather data regarding possible threats. However, vast quantities of surveillance information are useless unless there is a system in place whereby the gathered information can be collected, analyzed, and then disseminated to those who have both authority and ability to act on the intelligence.

A major step has been taken as a result of the National Security Policy. One of the key moves is a change in
activities at the Maritime Security Operations Centre (MSOC) in Halifax and Esquimalt. Primarily dedicated to naval and maritime air ops in the past, MOCs on both coasts are now being remodelled in order to integrate representatives from multiple agencies involved in domestic security (Coast Guard, Customs, Border Security etc.). These "new and improved" data fusion centres are envisioned to assume a pivotal role under the leadership of the Navy in coordinating these various efforts.

Another salient issue is that of foreign intelligence. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), has limits on its ability to gather intelligence outside of Canada. Yet the majority of terrorist groups are based abroad. We have a limited ability to collect SIGINT (SIGnals INTelligence: intelligence acquired by electronic means such as satellites) abroad; we are not involved in any HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence: intelligence acquired through agents on the ground) activities. Without significant foreign intelligence capacity of our own, we are dependent on our allies to provide us with foreign intelligence. Therefore, we are being fed only what our allies choose to share, and while these nations are considered friendly, they seek what is best for themselves and not necessarily what is best for Canada. Secondly, our inability to bring contributions to the intelligence pool threatens our sovereignty.

In asymmetric warfare it becomes more important than ever to "know thy enemy." In order to effectively pre-empt terrorist threats, Canada must first know what threats are coming and what form they may take. Trusting in random security sweeps to catch all incoming threats is a strategy doomed to failure.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that Nova Scotia's coastal security, and Canada's national security as a whole, requires increased effort to prepare this nation to meet the challenges and threats posed by organized crime, terrorism, and modern asymmetric warfare. Specific areas that require a greater focus include funding, equipment, personnel, intelligence, and defence response organization. Neglect in these areas could result in a breakdown in the chain between detection, intelligence analysis, information dissemination, and action/response, with possibly devastating results.

Obviously, the more funding that is devoted to security matters, the more we will be able to increase our surveillance and intelligence capabilities. Funding alone, however, is not enough—that funding must be spent wisely, and any new equipment purchased and new personnel hired must be placed into a framework that concentrates on the gathering, analyzing, and disseminating of information to agencies who have the mandate and the ability to enforce the law.

One wise use of additional defence funds would be to put money into replacing obsolete platforms and upgrading others to meet the technological demands of the 21st century. Before money is spent, the Forces must consider what it is spending money on. We cannot afford to buy everything, so we must consider our priorities, remembering that an ability to protect our homeland is the number one priority of a nation's military. For example, we must develop a littoral (Brown Water) naval capacity to defend our coastlines. Another would be to increase the number of Canadian Forces personnel. Additional challenges at home and abroad
will require additional personnel, as well as support staff and instructors. Currently, we can deploy roughly 4,000 personnel at any one time. Beyond that, we would not be able to handle the rotation ratios. Our total deployable force is 24,000, or roughly 40% of our total armed forces - a very high number compared to many other countries. At this point, the Canadian Forces are stretched to the breaking point attempting to meet all their commitments at home and abroad. And this is weakening our home defences.

An important caveat is that the acquisition of new equipment and the recruitment of new personnel cannot boost the Canadian Force's capacity overnight. However, a possible terrorist attack could occur at any time-perhaps tomorrow. Short term measures to address the shortfall, such as a closer cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy, can help protect Canada during our most vulnerable times.

Equipment is useless if not used properly. Similarly, personnel cannot help defend Canada if they are unable to detect potential threats or unable to respond to them. For this reason, intelligence is vital. Canada needs to improve both its intelligence gathering and its intelligence analyzing capabilities. This intelligence must then be disseminated through established chains of command, so that it is clear which agency is in charge of any given situation and in order to ensure that rescue and/or defence operations are conducted in a unified, efficient and effective manner.

Finally, the key to better defence is to encourage a more advanced understanding of current risks and responsibilities, not only among government leaders and military personnel, but among the general public. Politicians are often reluctant to support measures that are unpopular with the voting public. The events of Sept. 11, 2001 have, to some extent, caused the Canadian public to feel less secure and demand increased security measures to protect them from being the targets of terrorism. However, a public awareness of national security matters is vital for the average voter to understand that security is as important as education and health care to the function of a society. One of the goals of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia is to provide a forum where subjects of public interest can be discussed and information disseminated.

There is currently a Threat Risk Assessment underway on Canada's coastline. It is easy to foretell that this assessment will recommend increasing surveillance, particularly in the Arctic and of our coastal waters. We must remember that we cannot afford to neglect the intelligence half of the equation in order to make sense of the information we gather. Most of all, we must remember that one of the duties of a country is to ensure the safety of its citizens, and to ensure that we are properly prepared to prevent as much danger as we can, and to respond quickly when we cannot.